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The relationship between law and morality is such that it 
is not easy to separate the two concepts. Generally in Islam, law 
and morality are one and the same, and speaking of them as 
distinct ideas is not really possible. It is largely a problem of 
language, in that English distinguishes between law and morality, 
whereas Arabic does not clearly do so. It is, nevertheless, possible 
to parse the Shari‘a into aspects that resemble morality and those 
that resemble law, as Bernard Weiss does in The Search for God’s 
Law. The Shari‘a is the “totality of ‘divine categorizations of 
human acts’” (Weiss 1). However, the Shari‘a does not provide 
clear enough rules to guide behavior, and so must be articulated 
by Muslim scholars into concrete laws. The result is that Shari‘a 
comes to represent a theoretical law that cannot alone provide 
the legal code for a community. Despite the difficulty of 
separating law and morality within Islam, it is possible to view the 
Shari‘a as constituting morality and not law.  
In Islam law and morality are not divorceable. However, 
by adopting nuanced conceptions of law and morality as two parts 
that comprise one entity, it is possible to look at ways in which law 
and morality differ. In that morality represents punishment on 
judgment day and law represents punishment on earth by human 
judges, we can distinguish law and morality as two different 
aspects of Shari‘a categorizations (4). This is how Weiss 
distinguishes between law and morality in the categorizations of 
the Shari‘a. According to Weiss, particular categorizations of the 
Shari‘a—such as the categorizations of obligatory and 
forbidden—constitute rules of law because they give no option 
but to comply (3). Yet, he says, they also fall within the scope of 
morality. From this, Weiss concludes that, although law and 
morality in Islam are one and the same, they can be viewed as 
different aspects of the same concept (3-4). The key distinction 
between law and morality is “relevance to judicial proceeding” 
(4). The Shari‘a categorizations of obligatory and forbidden 
constitute both law and morality because they are relevant to 
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enforcement on earth and on the Day of Judgment. Thus, that 
which is relevant to enforcement by human judges corresponds 
to law, while that which is relevant to divine judgment constitutes 
morality.  
Weiss uses this idea of relevance to judicial proceeding to 
illustrate that the categorizations of the Shari‘a are comprised of 
both law and morality. It seems, however, given Weiss’ 
conceptions of law and morality, that the Shari‘a is more 
congruous with morality and less so with law. Law and morality 
are inseparable in Islam, and so in a sense Shari‘a must still 
constitute both. Yet given the distinction that Weiss makes 
between law and morality based on relevance to earthly or divine 
judgment, the Shari‘a falls more under the scope of morality. 
Because the Shari‘a ultimately plays the role of an ideal and 
theoretical law, its direct relevance to this-worldly judicial 
proceedings is limited. Weiss says that Muslims live “under the 
shadow of…two tribunals, one this-worldly and presided over by a 
human judge…and the other other-worldly and presided over by 
the divine judge” (4). Both aspects constitute law (where law is a 
set of enforced rules), but divine judgment more closely 
resembles morality.  
It would be reasonable to argue that neither realm of 
judgment really constitutes morality—in a modern conception of 
the term—because morality today is generally taken to mean 
guidelines for behavior for which there is not necessarily going to 
be a punishment. In all cases in Islam, there will be some form of 
retribution, whether by a human or divine judge. Thus behavior 
is always dictated by the threat of punishment, and as such might 
not constitute behavior based on morality. However, even in the 
modern context of morality, given a religious framework, it is 
usually seen as deriving from obedience to a god or higher 
power. Thus it does still make sense to equate divine judgment 
with morality.  
 Because the Shari‘a only becomes functional when it is 
interpreted and formulated by jurists into practical rules for 
behavior, it does not constitute “law” in the manner that Weiss 
describes. It is the ideal model from which practical judgments 
are made but does not serve as law in itself, and so falls into the 
category of morality. The categorizations of the Shari‘a are made 
concrete in fiqh, and it is only through these articulations that 
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applicable laws are created. Weiss uses “law” to mean “positive 
law,” as opposed to “moral code” (5). As a moral code is 
something that prescribes behavior but will only be enforced in 
another world (or not at all), the Shari‘a is more like a moral 
code than it is positive law. The Shari‘a does represent authority 
from which fiqh is derived, but it is fiqh which provides the actual 
understanding of divine law, and so it is fiqh which lays down the 
positive law under which Muslims live.  
 It is in this manner that the Shari‘a falls solidly into the 
realm of morality and out of the realm of law. Although the 
Shari‘a consists of divine law that will be enforced by God on 
Judgment Day, it is only with the articulations presented in fiqh 
that actual rules for how to act are established, and thus the 
Shari‘a in itself represents only a theoretical law. It is from the 
formulations of Muslim jurists that “we find law that may be 
applied in courts” (16). The Shari‘a bears very little direct 
relevance to this-worldly justice because its categorizations are 
not applicable in a practical sense until they are fully articulated 
in fiqh. Weiss uses morality to describe rules that pertain to justice 
in the afterlife; the Shari‘a is primarily relevant to other-worldly 
justice. It is not that the Shari‘a is concerned only with rules that 
will be enforced in another world, but that it is an ideal law that 
does not function as a guiding system until it is articulated in fiqh. 
The Shari‘a consists of categorizations that pertain to this-worldly 
matters, but it is in a form that needs to be interpreted and 
reformulated into workable laws. As Weiss explains, the Shari‘a is 
a “sort of Platonic ideal that scholars try to realize” (16). The 
Shari‘a is the inspiration and source of authority for Islamic law 
as expressed in fiqh, but because the Shari‘a represents only an 
ideal for which to strive, it remains a largely theoretical body of 
law. The theoretical relevance of Shari‘a to earthly justice as the 
source of practical law is not sufficient to grant it the status of law. 
Fiqh is able to stand as law “in its own right,” and thus it makes 
sense to call Shari‘a morality rather than law (16). Once law is 
articulated in fiqh, a community could potentially dispose of the 
Shari‘a and still have rules to govern life. Whatever legal 
prescriptions the Shari‘a makes, it is fiqh that actually instructs 
Muslims on how to behave.  Even if the Shari‘a is called “God’s 
law” and fiqh “the jurists’ law,” it is still fiqh that articulates both 
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divine and earthly law. The formulations of the jurists are 
obligatory to understanding law, including divine law.  
Law in Islam is “not a given,” but must be interpreted 
and deciphered from a “set of indicators,” which are found in the 
Qur’an and Shari‘a (16). This looks distinctly like law derived 
from morality. To the extent that morality is a loose framework 
off of which one bases actions, the Shari‘a is morality. Morality 
gives us ideas about what is right and wrong, but does not provide 
strict rules about particulars. Morality gives generals, from which 
can be derived rules about particulars. If morality stipulates that 
killing is wrong, then it may be the role of law to say if it is always 
wrong or if there are specific cases in which it is justified. Morality 
can inform legal decisions, but morality alone cannot constitute 
positive law. Fiqh, as the articulation of particulars from generals 
contained in the Shari ‘a, represents law; the Shari‘a represents 
morality.  
 Early Muslim scholars were primarily concerned with the 
understanding of the Shari‘a as it is associated with practice or 
action (3). Transitioning from theoretical law to practical law 
allowed for the definition of particulars from generals, and both 
were necessary in creation of a system of law that could practically 
govern a community. The Shari‘a provides prescriptions for 
behavior in its five categorizations, but these are somewhat vague 
and unspecific. It became necessary to take the divine law given 
in the Shari‘a and formulate it into concrete rules for behavior. 
Jurists articulated what was in the Shari‘a into practical law, or 
fiqh. By inferring practical law from the Shari‘a, jurists moved 
from the general to the particular. 
 Although Weiss distinguishes law and morality only by 
relevance to judicial proceedings, there is another important 
distinction between the two concepts, which lies in the 
formulation of rules by each. Morality provides a fluid outline of 
what are right and wrong behaviors, whereas law communicates 
more particular rules and prescriptions for behavior. This 
differentiation between generals and particulars can also be 
viewed in the distinction between theoretical and practical. Broad 
general rules provide a theoretical moral framework, while 
particulars dictate practical rules that govern very specific actions.  
 If there are actions that are not ruled by this-worldly 
law—that is, they will only be judged by God in the afterlife—
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these may be considered as belonging solely to the realm of 
divine law. In this way Shari‘a can still be seen as constituting a 
form of law, in that it pertains to rules that will be enforced by 
reward or punishment. Yet given Weiss’ use of the term “law” to 
indicate relevance to adjudication by human jurists, Shari‘a does 
not constitute law because it does not provide the actual rules 
that comprise the earthly legal system. As explained above, it is 
fiqh that establishes rules pertaining to this-worldly law, not the 
Shari‘a.  
We can call God’s revelation law because its rules are 
eventually enforced, but this divine law more closely resembles 
morality because we cannot take it alone to provide practical 
rules for community living. There is a necessary intermediate step 
between the ideal law and its practical formulation. From divine 
law jurists must create a set of laws to guide behavior, and without 
this practical articulation it would be difficult to understand how 
to behave in accordance with what God desires. The vagueness of 
the Qur’an and Shari‘a necessitates articulation of a practical law.  
  Fiqh is the articulation and understanding of the Shari‘a 
(24). Islamic philosopher al-Amidi placed particular emphasis on 
the understanding of Shari‘a as attainment of a special kind of 
knowledge. Possessing this knowledge elevated one to a higher 
status as a learned person (25). One implication of this is that 
those who reach this understanding of the Shari‘a obtain power. 
Only Muslim jurists are qualified to articulate the rules of fiqh, 
and these jurists have extra authority because they have the 
understanding. Amidi writes that although interpretation of the 
categorizations contained in the Shari‘a is very much a matter of 
opinion, fiqh is “knowledge, based on incontestable perception, 
of what constitutes [valid] conformity to those categorizations” 
(Weiss 25). The Shari‘a can be interpreted in multiple ways, so it 
is left to those with authority to establish the correct 
interpretation. Understanding of Shari‘a categorizations is 
fallible, but acceptance of jurists’ articulations is necessary in 
order to have practical laws under which a community can 
function (26).   
Through the articulation of universals, Islamic jurists 
established orthodoxy, which meant essentially the codification of 
morality. Scholars understood a morality given by God in the 
Qur‘an and Shari‘a which they then transcribed into practical 
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rules. The unity of law and morality is maintained in the creation 
of Islamic orthodoxy (not only what one must believe, but also 
the set of required practices). That is, orthodoxy prescribes law, 
but it equally connotes morality because one is compelled to obey 
based on a belief in God and commitment to obeying him. 
Practical jurisprudence is the manifestation of theoretical 
jurisprudence and the ideal law. This creates practical rules for 
behavior in an attempt to maintain the spirit and ideals of the 
theoretical law. In using the term orthodoxy, I mean orthodoxy 
as the created set of accepted practices and beliefs that are 
particularly intended to have widespread, practical application. 
Fiqh or practical jurisprudence are orthodoxy, whereas the 
Qur’an or even Shari‘a are not inherently orthodox. Something 
becomes orthodoxy once it is processed and adopted by those in 
power and claimed to be the truth or the only right way. Islamic 
jurists had to work out practical law given a rather open set of 
decrees in the Shari‘a, and this was where orthodoxy could be 
established. Orthodoxy is important with regard to jurisprudence 
because it creates a standard framework of prescriptions while 
maintaining the motivation or derivation from morality and 
religious devotion. If rulers simply said ‘you should do x, y and z 
because it’s good and we will punish you if you don’t,’ this is 
harder to impose broadly. But under jurisprudence, leaders 
could create equally rigid laws by appealing to religious devotion 
and belief in God. A practical articulation (fiqh) of the Shari‘a as 
it applies to everyday life is necessary to create a unified 
community with a standard set of behaviors and practices. Then it 
becomes necessary to call this law and enforce it on this earth. 
Where the creators of law can appeal to a model of religious 
morality they will have greater success in unifying a community 
and controlling behavior. In interpreting the Shari‘a and creating 
the articulation of practical law in fiqh, jurists created orthodoxy 
that maintained a moral basis for law. 
Fiqh itself is authoritative, in that it constitutes each 
individual’s understanding of the Shari‘a, and each must abide by 
this particular understanding (14). The Shari‘a is immutable, but 
fiqh is flexible enough to remain open to diverse interpretations. 
Thus, in articulating practical law from a body of theoretical 
universals, Islamic jurists could exercise power and authority over 
a community in a manner that did not conflict with the authority 
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of God given in the Qur’an and the Shari‘a. Fiqh brought the 
Shari‘a into the realm of interpretation and human control.  
In the end, we are still confronted by the linguistic 
problem created in the attempt to separate law and morality. It 
makes sense that law and morality cannot truly be divorced in 
Islam, because the two concepts are inherently intertwined. Also, 
there is a significant dichotomy between theoretical and practical 
jurisprudence that lends difficulty to the categorization of Islamic 
texts as law or morality. However, with deliberate and clear 
understanding of what is meant by the terms law and morality 
they can be distinguished. Although separate words for law and 
morality do not exist in Islam, there are evident differences 
between theoretical and practical law that closely resemble the 
distinction between morality and law. Law and morality may 
never exist without each other, but this does not mean we cannot 
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